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Abstract 
This paper examines competition between generic and brand-name drugs in the 
regulated Spanish pharmaceutical market. A nested logit demand model is specified 
for the three most consumed therapeutic subgroups in Spain: statins 
(anticholesterol), selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (antidepressants) and 
proton pump inhibitors (antiulcers). The model is estimated with instrumental 
variables from a panel of monthly prescription data from 1999 to 2005. The dataset 
distinguishes between three different levels of patients’ copayments within the 
prescriptions and the results show that the greater the level of insurance that the 
patient has (and therefore the lower the patient’s copayment), the lower the 
proportion of generic prescriptions made by physicians. It seems that the low level 
of copayment has delayed the penetration of generics into the Spanish market. 
Additionally, the estimation of the demand model suggests that the substitution 
rules and promotional efforts associated with the reference pricing system have 
increased generic market share, and that being among the first generic entrants has 
an additional positive effect.  
 
Keywords: pharmaceutical industry, generic competition, copayment, moral hazard  
 
JEL classifications: I11, I18, L13, L65 
 
 
                                                 
∗
 Competition Authority of Catalonia (ACCO), Generalitat de Catalunya; and research fellow of the 
Center for Research in Economics and Health (CRES), Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and of the 
Research Group on Governments and Markets (GiM), Universitat de Barcelona. E-mail: 
imorenot@gencat.cat 
 2 
 
Contents 
 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 2 
2. Generic competition .................................................................................. 3 
3. The Spanish pharmaceutical market......................................................... 7 
4. Data...........................................................................................................10 
5. Empirical strategy.....................................................................................14 
6. Results.......................................................................................................24 
7. Discussion.................................................................................................26 
8. Concluding remarks .................................................................................29 
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................31 
References.....................................................................................................32 
Figures and tables ........................................................................................37 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Drug expenditure is one of the fastest growing components of health expenditure in 
most countries (OECD, 2006) and knowing more about the factors that affect 
generic competition, which is a potential way of reducing spending, is very useful 
for the design of pharmaceutical policies.  
One important feature of the Spanish pharmaceutical market is that it is heavily 
regulated. The maximum price of each medicine is established individually and since 
December 1999, there has been a reference pricing system by which the National 
Health System (NHS) sets the maximum reimbursement for drugs when generic 
versions are available. This allows the competition of generic medicines to be 
studied in a regulated context and, since the NHS funds most prescription drug 
consumption, it is especially interesting to analyse how generic competition is 
affected by the level of insurance or reimbursement.  
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The main aim of this paper is thus to analyse to what extent market share depends 
on the level of patient copayment. The Spanish case, with three different levels of 
copayment (pensioner, non-pensioner and the chronically ill) is particularly 
interesting. Additionally, among other factors that may influence the success of 
generic competition, the effects of the application and modification of the reference 
pricing system and the order of entry into the market are of special concern.  
I contribute with empirical findings regarding these three important issues that 
affect generic competition. Most of the results I report could be extended to a great 
number of countries with similar institutional settings and pharmaceutical market 
characteristics: heavy regulation and a relatively low market penetration of generics. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section highlights the idiosyncrasy 
of the pharmaceutical market and generic competition. The third section explains 
the main features of the Spanish pharmaceutical market. The fourth section 
describes the dataset. The section after that presents the demand model and 
considers estimation issues. In the sixth and seventh sections I present and discuss 
the estimation results, respectively. Finally, the last section offers the concluding 
remarks. 
2. Generic competition  
When brand-name drugs are no longer protected by patents or other legal rules, 
generic equivalents can enter the market. Such drugs contain the same active 
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ingredients and have proved bioequivalence1 with the original product, to the 
satisfaction of health authorities. However, the manufacturer and certain 
characteristics (such as colour, shape, inactive ingredients or packaging) may be 
different. Therefore, they may be considered substitutes for the brand-name drugs 
but not perfect substitutes: in other words, there is some degree of differentiation.  
The expected result of generics entering the market is an increase in the level of 
competition and possibly a reduction in prices and the brand-name product’s 
market share. It is also expected that when the number of generics on the market is 
considerable, prices tend towards the cost of production. However, for brand-name 
products, the American literature shows some evidence of prices increases after the 
entry of generics into the market (for instance: Grabowski and Vernon, 1992; Frank 
and Salkever, 1997): this has been called the “generic paradox” (Scherer, 1993). 
In the pharmaceutical industry, the institutional setting is very important and affects 
market competition. The dispensing process is complex and the physician, the 
pharmacist, the third-party payer (a public health insurer in most countries) and the 
patient all play a role. The physician and the pharmacist may be perfect agents for 
the patient in which case their choices (together with those of the patient) will 
maximize utility for the patient. In contrast, the physician or the pharmacist may be 
perfect agents for the third-party payer (ultimately tax-payers when there is a public 
                                                 
1 Pharmaceutical products are bioequivalent if they are pharmaceutically equivalent or 
pharmaceutical alternatives, and display comparable bioavailability, when studied under similar 
experimental conditions. Bioequivalence is considered proven if the bioavailabilities, in terms of 
peak and total exposure after administration of the same molar dose under the same conditions, are 
similar to such a degree that the effects of the studied products can be expected to be essentially the 
same. 
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insurer) or even, in some countries, for themselves2. There is also room for 
intermediate situations. 
The process starts when the physician decides to prescribe a drug. He may choose 
to prescribe a generic or a brand-name drug. Hellerstein (1998) found that 
physicians play an important role in determining whether patients receive brand-
name or generic pharmaceuticals and that some are more likely to prescribe generics 
while others are more likely to prescribe brand-name products. The practitioner, as 
the patient’s agent, may choose a brand-name drug if he believes that it is of better 
quality and is not concerned about the cost of the drug. Moreover, the physician 
may prefer the brand-name drug because of his experience with the product over 
the period of exclusivity, during patent protection, or because there are no 
incentives to change prescription habits (López-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy, 2000). 
This brand-name loyalty of the practitioner may explain why, in some markets, 
brand-name products enjoy large market shares even when there are cheaper generic 
drugs available.  
Coscelli (2000) found that in addition to the physician, patient characteristics also 
affect the prescription decision. Since brand-name and generic drugs may differ in 
inert ingredients as well as in colour and shape, some patients may wish not to 
change from the brand-name drug they are used to taking to a generic version. This 
may be particularly true if they have doubts about quality and do not pay for the 
                                                 
2 Iizuka (2007) analyzes the trade-off for physicians between being good agents for themselves or 
for the patients in the Japanese pharmaceutical market.  
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drug or make only a small copayment; the patient may have a preference to 
consume brand-name drugs and may influence the physician’s choice.  
Apart from the physician and the patient, the pharmacist may participate in the 
choice of drug, for instance by choosing which generic to dispense. When a generic 
drug is dispensed, there is competition between different generic products. As stated 
by Yu and Gupta (2008), the choice at this stage is mainly based on which generics 
are available at the pharmacy, that is, the pharmacist’s choice of a generic producer 
within the market defined by the active ingredient.  
The dispensing process follows a multi-level market structure, as shown in Figure 1. 
The first choice is between whether to dispense a drug from a therapeutic subgroup 
or to prescribe an alternative treatment for the condition, such as a drug from 
another related therapeutic subgroup, whether to take homeopathic products, 
whether to take exercise, and so on. If a therapeutic subgroup is chosen, the next 
step is to decide on an active ingredient. The third decision is to choose a specific 
presentation from all the possibilities for the molecule, in other words, to choose a 
combination of the strength and the number of units. The following stage is the 
choice between branded and generic drugs. And finally, there is the choice from 
among the different producers.  
Furthermore, the public payer may affect the decision by implementing obligatory 
substitution rules and requirements that limit reimbursements, such as the reference 
pricing system.  
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3. The Spanish pharmaceutical market 
The Spanish NHS is funded from tax revenue and provides health care services with 
copayments for prescribed pharmaceuticals. The standard rate of copayment is 40%, 
but the average copayment is very low and accounts for less than 7% of the total 
expenditure on ambulatory prescription pharmaceuticals, since prescription drugs 
for pensioners and some other specific groups, such as the handicapped or people 
who have suffered occupational accidents and their dependents, have no charge; 
and drugs indicated specially for chronic diseases have a rate of only 10% with an 
upper limit. 
The prescription market dominates sales: the share of prescription drugs is 85.50% 
of volume and 92% of total sales, and over-the-counter (OTC) medicines account 
for the remaining 14.50% of volume and 8% of total sales (Costa-Font and Puig-
Junoy, 2005).  
Another important feature of the Spanish market is that there are a great number of 
different presentations of drugs due to there still being considerable numbers of 
copies and also to the entry of new drugs into the market. In fact, there are three 
types of prescription drugs in Spain: original brand-name drugs (which might be 
marketed either by the patent holder or by a licensee), copy brand-name drugs and 
generics. This is due to the fact that, although Spain joined the European Patent 
Convention in 1986, it did not grant product patent rights until 8 October 1992, due 
to a transitional period in accordance with Article 167 of that convention. Before 
1992, there were only process patents. Thus, older drugs are marketed 
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simultaneously in the form of branded original products, branded licensed products, 
branded copy products and generics.  
Although generic drugs were introduced into Spain in 1997, the market share of 
generic medicines was low at the end of the period analysed: only 14.60% in units 
and 7.90% in value (IMS Health, 2006b). Generics obtain market authorization 
when one has already been authorized in another European Union (EU) member 
state in which the original drug enjoyed product patent protection, or when ten 
years have passed since the original brand-name drug was released onto the Spanish 
market (the “ten-year rule”).  
Although Spain is a relatively low-price country with limited generic penetration, in 
December 1999 a reference pricing system was introduced for off-patent drugs with 
the same active ingredient (chemical equivalence). This policy has gradually been 
extended to reimburse payment for a growing list of active chemical ingredients.  
All versions of off-patent drugs, branded and generics, were included in their 
respective group of bioequivalent drugs and a group was created once there was at 
least one generic version of the respective active ingredient. The reference price was 
determined endogenously as a function of drug prices in the relevant market: for 
each group, a reference price was calculated as the weighted average selling price of 
the lowest-priced drug accounting for at least 20% of the market (year on year)3. 
                                                 
3 If the difference between this price and the highest price for the group was less than 10%, the 
reference price was the result of applying a 10% reduction to the highest price. If the difference 
between the calculated price and the highest priced product was more than 50%, the reference price 
was exactly 50% of the highest priced product. Whatever the situation, the reference price was 
never lower than the generic with the lowest price (López-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy, 2000). 
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This system established the maximum price that could be reimbursed by the NHS 
for any version of the same drug. Whenever the price of any prescribed drug was 
higher than the reference price, patients could opt for the prescribed drug by paying 
the difference between its price and the reference price. So, it implied a copayment 
that depended on the price of the chosen drug and that could be avoided if the drug 
was cheaper than the reference price4. 
However, since January 2004 the reference price has been calculated as the average 
of the three lowest costs per day of treatment, for each form of administration of an 
active ingredient, according to its defined daily dose (DDD)5. With this new system, 
if prescriptions specify drugs priced higher than the reference price, pharmacists are 
obliged to substitute them with the cheapest generic version. However, if 
prescriptions specify drugs priced equal to or lower than the reference price, 
pharmacists are not obliged to substitute them. When the prescription has been 
written using the name of the active ingredient, the pharmacist has to dispense the 
lowest-priced generic drug. In this way, reference pricing has become a system for 
establishing the maximum reimbursement price that a drug may have without being 
excluded from the list of publicly financed drugs, that is, a kind of price capping 
system. 
                                                 
4 In fact, the part of the price under the reference price may also involve a non-avoidable 
copayment. For instance, non-pensioners pay 40% of the price under the reference price. The 
avoidable copayment is the total amount above the reference price and is in addition to the non-
avoidable copayment. 
5 A defined daily dose is the average dose per day in adults for a drug when it is used to treat its 
main indication. 
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Moreover, the maximum ex-factory price of all drugs (branded and generic) is set 
during the process of obtaining market approval, and usually the introduction price 
remains the maximum price for most of the life of the product (Borrell, 2003). The 
government uses a peculiar form of cost-based price regulation for branded drugs in 
which manufacturing, marketing and research costs, as well as an industrial profit on 
invested capital, are allocated to new drugs. However, this is rarely the final price 
since the legislation allows other factors to be considered, such as the price of the 
same product in other European countries, the price of drugs that can be 
considered substitutes or the therapeutic innovation of the medicine. In fact, the 
legal criteria are that the price has to reflect the therapeutic value of the drug as well 
as the cost of comparable treatments, the price of the same drug in other countries, 
and some other political issues such as the contribution to the national economy 
(Antoñanzas et al., 2007). The wholesalers’ and retailers’ mark-ups are also 
regulated6. 
4. Data 
I use a dataset of monthly prescription drug consumption from 1999 to 2005, 
provided by the Directorate-General of Pharmacy and Health Products of the 
Spanish Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs, which is complemented with 
data from the Nomenclator Digitalis of the NHS Health Information Institute 
(Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo, 2005) and from the Base de Datos del Conocimiento 
                                                 
6 More details of Spanish regulations and reimbursement policies are available in Nonell and Borrell 
(2001), Puig-Junoy (2007) and Costa-Font and Puig-Junoy (2005). 
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Sanitario 2005 - BOT PLUS (Consejo General de Colegios Oficiales de 
Farmacéuticos, 2005). 
I analyse outpatient data for non-paediatric oral prescription drugs containing only 
one active chemical ingredient. As Table 1 shows, the sample includes 15 market 
presentations for seven active ingredients in the three most consumed therapeutic 
subgroups in Spain: statins (HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors), selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs; antidepressants) and proton pump inhibitors (antiulcer 
agents). The data is not a sample but the entire market for these drugs: all the drugs 
sold in Spain and financed (at least partially) by the NHS. The active ingredients 
from the statin subgroup are lovastatin and simvastatin; from the antidepressant 
subgroup they are citalopram, fluoxetine, fluvoxamine and paroxetine; and from the 
antiulcer subgroup the active ingredient is omeprazole. 
As the Table 1 shows, the different active ingredients have several doses and are 
sold in different presentations, therefore, all the quantities sold are converted into 
common units. For each presentation I calculate the total milligrams of the active 
ingredient and transform this into patient days using the DDD, that is, I calculate 
the total number of DDDs per package7. Prices are calculated from the dataset by 
dividing volumes of sales in euros by the quantities sold. Then, for each product I 
calculate the price per DDD.  
                                                 
7 For this purpose I use the DDD of each active ingredient established by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology. The use of this 
international standard dosage enables standardization and comparison of drug quantities across 
therapeutic groups, active ingredients and presentations. 
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Table 1 also shows the indications of each active ingredient together with the date 
of entry of the first generic drug and of the implementation of the reference pricing 
system for the first time, for each market presentation. Statins are used to lower 
cholesterol levels in people with, or at risk of, cardiovascular disease. SSRIs are a 
class of antidepressants mainly used in the treatment of depression, anxiety 
disorders and some personality disorders. Proton pump inhibitors are a subgroup of 
antiulcer drugs whose main action is a reduction of gastric acid production and they 
are used in the treatment of many conditions, such as peptic ulcer.  
The panel data is unbalanced since different drugs fulfilled the legal requirements of 
generic entry and entry happened at different times, however, each market 
presentation is observed for at least 35 months. There are a total of 23,584 
observations involving 318 different presentation forms and 51 manufacturers. A 
total of 11,839 observations are of pensioners’ consumption, and the remaining 
11,745 are from non-pensioners’ prescriptions. Of the latter, 4,410 observations 
correspond to the consumption of products indicated for chronic diseases8. 
Each separate market is formed of medicines that compete with other close but not 
perfect substitute medications. In the pharmaceutical industry, defining the market 
is not easy since medicines are indicated for treatment of different conditions. 
Although it is an imperfect approach, some authors (for instance, Aronsson, 
Bergman and Rudholm, 2001; Dalen, Strøm and Haabeth, 2006; Moreno-Torres, 
                                                 
8 All the medicines in the antidepressant class are considered for chronic treatment and have a 
reduced 10% rate of copayment for non-pensioners; the remaining drugs, in other therapeutic 
groups, have a 40% rate of copayment for non-pensioners. 
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Puig-Junoy and Borrell, 2009) take the therapeutic active ingredient level according 
to the WHO’s Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification as their 
approach.  
In order to tackle the non-linearity of the differently-sized presentation prices and to 
take advantage of variation among markets to identify parameters, I use the 
presentation (active ingredient with a specific dosage and size) as the market. 
Furthermore, the reference pricing system is frequently applied to different 
presentations, even for the same active ingredient, at different times and therefore 
these dynamics allow the effects of this system to be identified.  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the number of generics in three representative 
markets, one in each therapeutic class. The usual pattern is a marked increase in the 
number of generic competitors during the first years after the loss of market 
protection and stabilization at the end of the series.  
Table 2 shows the evolution of the structure of the market at the end of each of the 
years analysed. There is a clear increase in the number of generic manufacturers for 
the whole dataset. The increase in their market share was also considerable until 
2003; however, since then, the incorporation into the dataset of new markets with 
less generic penetration is reflected in a recovery of brand-name products. 
Moreover, there is a reduction in prices per DDD for brand-name and generic 
products; the latter always have lower prices than the former.  
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Figures 3 shows the evolution of market shares for the three representative markets 
and illustrates an interesting issue: in the prescriptions for pensioners, the generic 
market share is lower than in the prescriptions for non-pensioners. Figure 4 
displays the evolution of the average brand-name and generic prices per DDD for 
the three same markets. Generic prices are almost always lower than brand-name 
prices although there is some convergence throughout the time. Finally, Figure 5 
displays that the market shares of the first three (groups of) generics are usually 
greater than the average market share from the sixth entrant on for the same 
sample. 
5. Empirical strategy 
I use a structural discrete choice model of product differentiation. In this model the 
utility for consumers depends on product characteristics and individual tastes; firms 
are modelled as price-setting oligopolists and endogenous market outcomes are 
derived from an assumption of a Nash equilibrium in prices. This kind of demand 
model has been applied to many products such as ready-to-eat cereals (Nevo, 2000a 
and 2001), yogurts (Di Giacomo, 2008), movie theatres (Davis, 2006) and cars 
(Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995; Verboven, 1996; or Petrin, 2002). They have 
also been used to analyse demand for pharmaceuticals by several authors such as 
Stern (1996), Cleanthous (2004), Dalen, Strøm and Haabeth (2006), Iizuka (2007), 
Yu and Gupta (2008), Kaiser, Mendez and Rønde (2010) and Coronado (2010). 
As my main interest is how copayment affects competition between brand-name 
drugs and generics, as well as considering competition between generics, I use a 
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two-level nested logit model based on Berry (1994) and especially on the application 
of such a model to the pharmaceutical market by Yu and Gupta (2008)9.  
As stated by Berry (1994), in contrast to the simple multinomial logit model, the 
nested logit model allows consumer tastes to be correlated across products. There is 
correlation between the idiosyncratic shocks of products in the same segment of the 
market. This prevents the independence from irrelevant alternatives property and 
allows for reasonable substitution patterns.  
In comparison to the random coefficients alternative10, the nested logit model may 
be sensitive to the specification of the nest structure because the researcher chooses 
the options that are potentially close a priori11. However, in the case of 
pharmaceuticals this is not a crucial pitfall since it is possible to use the ATC 
classification to build the structure of the nests12.  
In this demand model drugs are grouped into mutually exclusive markets. In each 
market, for instance “omeprazole 20 milligrams 14 capsules”, there are the brand-
name and the generic nests. In each generic nest there is a set of drugs denoted j = 
1, …, J. I group all the different brand-name drugs within a single nest (original 
brand-name and copy brand-name drugs) so there is only one possibility available in 
                                                 
9 An alternative approach is the multistage budgeting model applied by Ellison et al. (1997) to 
analyze the demand for cephalosporins.  
10 The nested logit model can be interpreted as a special case of the random coefficients model with 
random coefficients only on group-specific dummy variables (Berry, 1994). 
11 For those cases in which the order of the nests is important, Bresnahan, Stern and Trajtenberg 
(1997) developed the principles-of-differentiation general extreme-value model. 
12 The therapeutic groups are formed on the basis of the 4th level of the ATC code that 
approximates the chemical, therapeutic or pharmacological group (for example, N06AB for SSRIs: 
antidepressants). The pharmaceutical presentations within a group can be considered close 
substitutes since they have the same active chemical ingredient (5th level of the ATC code: the 
group for the chemical substance; for instance, N06AB05 for paroxetine). 
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this nest. The outside good represents the alternative to choose a generic or brand-
name drug and is assumed to be the only member of its own group.   
I assume that the physician chooses a unit of the drug that maximizes utility for the 
patient, even though the final consumption may be affected by the substitution rules 
and the availability of the product at the drugstore. 
The indirect utility function for consumer i of consuming the generic drug j in the 
period t is: 
[ ] ijt
g
igjgjtijt du εσζδ )1( −++= ∑          (1) 
where jtδ  is the mean utility level of product j, which is the same for all consumers, 
and ijtε  is an identically and independently distributed extreme value random 
variable that represents the distribution of consumer preferences about the mean 
utility. jgd is a dummy variable that is equal to one for drugs in a specific market, g, 
and zero otherwise; and so, igζ  is common to all products in market g and has a 
distribution function that depends on the parameter σ, with 0 ≤ σ < 1. This 
parameter measures the within-nest correlation of utility levels and allows to include 
the correlation between groups of similar products. If σ approaches 0, the within-
group correlation of utility levels is low, and the model tends toward the 
multinomial logit (Besanko, Gupta and Jain, 1998). When σ tends toward 1, the 
within-nest correlation of utilities approaches 1. As Cardell (1997) proved, an 
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additional property of this model is that if ijtε  is an extreme value random variable, 
[ ijtig εσζ )1( −+ ] is also an extreme value random variable.  
Let me define the indirect utility function for the consumer i of consuming a brand-
name drug as: 
ibtbtibtu εδ +=          (2) 
From the derivation by Berry (1994) and following Yu and Gupta (2008), I obtain 
the following estimating equation:  
jttgjbtjtbtjt sss υσδδ ++−= )ln()()/ln( ,/       (3) 
where: )/ln( btjt ss  is the log of the relative market share between the generic j and 
the group of brand-name products; )ln( ,/ tgjs  is the log of the share of the generic j 
in the group of generic products in market g; and jtυ  is an error term. 
I assume that the mean utility of the brand-name drugs depends on the quality that 
consumers perceive these drugs to have due to their being an incumbent product, 
and I expect that an increase in the average price per DDD reduces brand-name 
drugs’ market share. For the generic drugs, I assume that the mean utility depends 
on the months since it has been on the market and on the price per DDD. The 
former is expected to affect generics’ market shares positively, because generic 
producers need time to spread their products through markets; while the price is 
expected to be inversely related to the market share of generic products.  
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Thus, the econometric specification to be estimated is: 
jtm
RPII
gt
RPI
gtgtjjbtjt DDCCsXss υωααττσγα +++++++Π++= 2110201/ )ln()/ln(      (4) 
The first term at the right-hand side is a constant and the second term represents an 
order-of-entry fixed effect13. The term X  is the matrix of variables that explain the 
differences in the mean utilities of brands and generics, including the time each 
generic has been on the market and the logs of prices. Let X  also include other 
variables that may affect utility for consumers and thus generic penetration, such as 
the number of indications of the active ingredient, the number of DDDs per unit, 
the number of units in the package and the number of different brand-name 
products on the market at the moment of patent expiry. Π  is a vector of parameters 
to be estimated. σ is the parameter that measures the level of substitution between 
generics in a given market and )ln( ,/ tgjs  is the log of the within-generic group 
market share.  
I incorporate two dummy variables related to copayment levels. The first copayment 
dummy variable, 0C , is equal to one for pensioners’ consumptions, because 
pensioners do not have any out-of-pocket expenses. The second dummy variable, 
10C , is equal to one for the consumption of those products designated for the 
chronically ill, in which non-pensioners have a reduced copayment rate of only 10%. 
Therefore, the group of comparison is formed of the products with the general 40% 
rate of copayment. 
                                                 
13 In the strict sense, these are not drug-specific fixed effects because in some cases more than one 
drug entered the market in the same month and these drugs are grouped into the same dummy 
variable. Moreover, all the products that enter the market after the 5th entrant (or group of entrants) 
are grouped together and act as the comparison group. 
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My hypothesis is that physicians and pharmacists act as better agents for the patients 
than for the third-party payer (the NHS or tax-payers) and prescribe and sell more 
expensive brand-name products to those patients with larger levels of insurance 
coverage (i.e., lower copayments). Physicians and pharmacists may be influenced by 
their patients’ interests and thus introduce some degree of moral hazard. Thus, I 
expect to find larger generic market shares for the chronically ill, with a 10% 
copayment, and especially for the non-pensioners group, with no copayment 
reduction, since they have to contribute to the cost of the drug with a copayment 
rate of 40% and generics are generally cheaper.  
Some studies, such as Pavcnik (2002) or Regan (2008), find empirical evidence of 
the effect of copayment on prices and some theoretical papers try to explain the 
“generic paradox” by appeal to the level of insurance coverage (Kong, 2008; and 
Ferrara and Kong, 2008). Some papers find evidence of the effect of copayment on 
the demand for pharmaceuticals in the US market (such as Esposito, 2005; Coulson 
and Stuart, 1995; Coulson et al., 1995), although their results cannot be applied 
directly to Spain because the institutional setting is quite different.  
However, in the Swedish market, which is more similar to the Spanish market, 
Rudholm (2005) found that when the level of pharmaceutical insurance is greater, 
not only does the quantity consumed increase but so does the price of the products 
dispensed, and Lundin (2000) showed that patients with high insurance coverage 
consume more brand-name drugs (relative to of generics) than patients with lower 
insurance coverage. When the cost for the patient of a brand-name product 
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increases in comparison to the generic version, it is more likely that the doctor will 
prescribe the generic. 
Another important issue addressed by Yu and Gupta (2008) is the effect of the 
order of market entry of generics on their market shares. In the American 
pharmaceutical industry there is some evidence that earlier entrants make larger 
profits (for instance Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz, 1991; Berndt et al., 1995; Cook, 
1998). In fact, the “generic paradox” may be interpreted as brand-name loyalty 
derived from a first-mover advantage. In the pharmaceutical market, first-mover 
advantage brings pricing power and allows the manufacturer to retain a considerable 
market share as the number of competitors increases.  
This advantage also seems to hold for the first generic entrants; which retain a 
considerable market share and have higher prices than later generic entrants. Yu and 
Gupta (2008) and Kalyanaram (2008) in the US and Hollis (2002) in Canada found 
evidence of larger market shares for the first or earlier generic entrants. This may be 
interpreted as consumers obtaining more utility from the first generics on the 
market. That is why I include fixed effects relating to the order of entry. This is also 
a relevant issue for competition policy, since some brand-name drug producers pre-
empt the generic segment of the market with their own “branded generics” (also 
known as “pseudo generics” or “authorized generics”). In other words, incumbent 
brand-name manufacturers sometimes also manufacture the first generic product 
(Hollis, 2005; Reiffen and Ward, 2007).  
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In Spain, as Reiffen and Ward (2005) indicated in the US market, the timing of entry 
into the market is not generally under the control of manufacturers. The date of 
approval by health authorities is not known with certainty, or indeed even if they 
will obtain the approval, and neither do they know how many other applications for 
that market will be approved, or when this may happen. Thus, order-of-entry can be 
considered as exogenous. 
I include a dummy variable, RPIgtD , that is equal to one from the moment the 
reference price is applied to the market until December 2003, and equal to zero 
before the implementation of the reference price (or when it is not implemented) 
and after December 2003. A second dummy variable, RPIIgtD , is equal to one when 
the reference price is applied to the market from January 2004 onwards, and equal 
to zero before this moment (or when the reference price is not implemented). In 
this way, there are three periods for each product: the period previous to the 
implementation of reference pricing, during which the price capping regulation 
works; the period in which the first reference price system is applied; and the period 
of the second reference price system. If a product is not affected by the reference 
price system, the price capping regulation sets its maximum ex-factory price. The 
first period acts as the comparison group.  
Other policies implemented during the period analysed, such as obligatory 
reductions of ex-factory prices, reductions of pharmacy and wholesaler price 
margins, or revisions of reference prices, have no dummy variables since all these 
effects act through the variation in the prices included in the specification.    
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It should be considered that, in addition to its effects through the variation of 
relative prices and copayments, reference pricing is accompanied by specific 
substitution rules and promotion of generic prescriptions by health authorities. 
Thus, since prices are introduced in the econometric specification, the parameters 
1α  and 2α will only capture the effects that are additional to those due to price 
variations. For instance, the introduction of reference pricing can increase generic 
market share if it means that brand-name products are relatively more expensive 
than generics (effect through the prices) but it can also increase generic market share 
because of obligatory substitution (an effect which is in addition to the price 
changes). 
I also introduce firm-specific fixed effects in the model, mω ; that is, a variable that is 
equal to one for a specific firm across drugs and markets and to zero otherwise. The 
role of these fixed effects is to control for time invariant factors in addition to 
order-of-entry fixed effects, such as product quality or promotional effort, that are 
usually common to all the products a firm manufacturers. In fact, market shares of 
competing generic drugs are driven by pharmacists’ choice of a generic producer 
within the market and generic manufacturers build a reputation and develop 
idiosyncratic skills in launching and delivering drugs.  
The quality of the product together with promotional and marketing activity 
expenses are observable to the consumer but not to the researcher (that is, they are 
not totally captured by the variables included). These unobserved factors are 
correlated with the drug price and with the log of a generic drug’s share within the 
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group of generics. To partially overcome this pitfall, I use the aforementioned firm-
specific dummy variables. These fixed effects capture the mean quality of a drug and 
the marketing effort invested in it, leaving the time-specific and product-specific 
deviations as part of the error term. The potential remaining inconsistency in 
estimation arises from factors that change over time or variation among products 
from the same firm. 
To deal with this remaining endogeneity I use instrumental variables. Following the 
empirical industrial organization literature (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995) and 
papers that consider the pharmaceutical industry (Iizuka, 2007; Stern, 1996), I 
considered as possible instruments: the number of products a firm and its 
competitors manufacture; the product characteristics; and the sums of these at 
different levels of aggregation. Of these available instruments I chose the set with 
the strongest correlation with the endogenous variables that did not reject the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity according to the Sargan-Hansen test (Sargan, 1958; and 
Hansen, 1982). These instruments are the number of other products from the same 
firm and the number of products from other firms with the same active ingredient 
and the sum of the variable time-in-market and the sum of a dummy reference price 
variable for the therapeutic class.  
I use a random-effects generalized two-stage least squares method to estimate 
equation (4). This method is applied by Yu and Gupta (2008) and also in other 
papers that study generic competition in the pharmaceutical industry, such as 
Reiffen and Ward (2005) or Regan (2008). Since some important explanatory 
variables in the dataset, such as the level of insurance, are constant over time, I 
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cannot use the alternative fixed effects approach. Hence, the error term, jtυ , is 
formed of an individual effect, jε , and an error term, jtη , which is assumed to 
follow a normal distribution with a mean of zero and variance 2ησ . In addition, 
following Berry (1994), I use the methodology that has been most used in the 
empirical industrial organization literature: the (two-stage) generalized method of 
moments. The results of the two estimations are highly analogous. Table 3 shows 
the definitions and the descriptive statistics of the variables that I use in the 
regression analysis.  
6. Results 
Table 4 shows the estimation of the demand model. The generalized two-stage least 
squares random effects and the two-stage generalized method of moments 
estimations are quite similar. The within-generic market share is clearly significant 
and its coefficient is around 0.50. This result validates the use of the nested logit 
model instead of a simple multinomial logit model, since the model is consistent 
with the random utility maximization only when this parameter is significant and 
between 0 and 1.  
Prices per DDD are also significant and have the expected signs. A 1% increase in 
the generic price reduces the relative market share, that is, the weight of the generic 
producer market share over the brand-name products market share, between 5.86% 
and 5.98%. In contrast, a 1% increase of the average price of the brand-name 
products raises the relative market share by between 3.97% and 4.26%.    
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I also control for the time the generic product has been on the market, the number 
of indications of the active ingredient, the number of DDDs per tablet, the number 
of tablets per package, the number of brand-name presentations in the period 
before generic entry and for therapeutic subgroups and firm-specific fixed effects. 
Most of these factors are significant and have the expected signs. For instance, in 
those markets in which there were a larger number of brand-name drugs, the 
generics market share is lower. Interestingly, generics gain greater market shares in 
smaller packet markets (fewer units or lower dosage per unit).  
There is a significant and negative effect of the dummy for consumptions without 
copayment; that is, the mean relative generic market share is smaller in prescriptions 
dispensed to pensioners. The difference in comparison to the group of non-
pensioners, who have a 40% rate of copayment, is a relative market share that is 
between 68.32% and 69.41% smaller. I find a similar result, but a lower impact, for 
non-pensioner consumptions of products to treat chronic conditions, which have a 
reduced rate of copayment of only 10%. In this group, the mean relative market 
share is roughly 40% smaller than in the group of non-pensioners with the 40% rate 
of copayment. 
The introduction of the reference price system in Spain contributed to the 
penetration of generic products beyond its effect through prices. Thus, the effect of 
the implementation of the first system was an increase of the relative market share 
of 62%-63% in comparison to the period with the price capping regulation. The 
change in the system, from 2004 on, brought with it a larger effect. The application 
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of the second reference pricing system raised the relative market share by between 
91% and 107%. 
The five dummy variables for the first five groups of generic entrants are significant 
and have a positive coefficient. That means that the first generic entrants in the 
market have a greater market share than the sixth or later groups of entrants. The 
coefficients decrease, although not linearly, and in fact the first two groups of 
entrants have a mean relative market share that is between 84.50% and 93.00% 
greater than the sixth and later entrants, whereas the following three groups of 
entrants are only between 26.46% and 35.03% greater than the sixth and later 
entrants. The coefficients are quite similar in the generalized method of moments 
estimation, although only the first three groups have a significant coefficient. 
7. Discussion 
The coefficient of the within-generic market share is significant and has a value of 
0.51. However, it is lower than expected: if generic drugs are close substitutes, it 
should be close to 1. This value is slightly lower than the value of approximately 
0.60 found by Yu and Gupta (2008); it seems that there is not only product 
differentiation between brand-name and generic products, but also among generic 
medicines.  
As expected, prices have a negative effect on the demand for drugs and the effect of 
high generic prices is greater than the effect on brand-name products. This may be 
explained by price being a more decisive factor in the consumption of generics, 
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whereas for brand-name products some other characteristics, such as experience or 
reputation, are more relevant. The other market and drug characteristics also have 
the expected effects. The fact that generics gain greater shares in markets of fewer 
units or lower dose may be due to physicians or patients trusting brand-name 
products more for intense treatments. 
As expected, there is some moral hazard effect. For those patients with greater 
insurance, that is, with no or a lower rate of copayment, the consumption of 
generics is lower than for patients with the general rate of copayment. In other 
words: the greater the level of insurance, the lower the proportion of generic 
prescriptions. This result seems to confirm the hypothesis that physicians and 
pharmacists are better agents for the patients than for the NHS or tax-payers and 
prescribe and sell more expensive brand-name products to patients with higher 
levels of insurance coverage, or are influenced by the moral hazard of patients. 
Therefore, the low level of copayment in Spain has affected the penetration of 
generics negatively. This result is coherent with those of Rudholm (2005) and 
Lundin (2000). 
The positive and clearly significant coefficients of the two reference pricing system 
dummies indicate that, beyond the effects of these regulations through the variation 
of relative prices and copayments, the substitution rules and the promotion of 
generic prescriptions by health authorities has been successful in promoting generic 
penetration into the market. Moreover, with the second reference pricing system the 
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increase of generic market shares increased. This may be the result of intensified 
promotion of generics.  
Finally, I find that the order of market entry of generic manufacturers has the 
expected effect. This confirms that earlier-mover advantage seems to be true for the 
first generic entrants, which are able to obtain a considerable market share. Similarly 
to Yu and Gupta (2008), Kalyanaram (2008) or Hollis (2002), I find evidence of 
larger market shares for the first generic entrants, which is probably explained by 
the loyalty derived from market experience due to being the first generics.  
Furthermore, it seems that in Spain part of the competition occurs in the form of 
discounts to official prices, as in the cases of France (Kanavos and Taylor, 2007) 
and the Netherlands (Danzon and Ketcham, 2004). This situation generates profits 
for pharmacies and wholesalers but no savings to patients or the NHS (Puig-Junoy, 
2009; and Borrell and Merino-Castelló, 2007). In this case, first generic entrants, 
with higher prices than later entrants (since generic prices generally depend on the 
order of entry14), have a first-mover advantage twice: that obtained from actually 
being the first generics on the market, and a higher price that allows them to offer 
higher rebates to pharmacies. 
Precisely one of the limitations of this analysis is the lack of information about 
possible rebates from generic producers and wholesalers to the pharmacies. As 
mentioned above, a key factor in competition among generic producers is 
                                                 
14 The NHS, a monopsony, uses its buying power to negotiate a reduction in the maximum official 
price of new additional generics. This is similar to the case of New Zealand (Danzon and Ketcham, 
2004). 
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pharmacist choice of a specific generic producer within the market of an active 
ingredient. However, I only have information about the official prices that were paid 
by the NHS to pharmacies. This is overcome partially since rebates are part of the 
promotional efforts of the firms and the endogeneity that this lack of information 
generates was addressed through the use of firm-specific fixed effects and 
instrumental variables. 
Moreover, the consumption data is aggregated for the entire Spanish market, 
whereas some regions apply different policies regarding the promotion of generic 
medicines or active ingredient prescribing. Therefore, it is not possible to control 
for this geographical heterogeneity.  
Finally, I use copayment dummy variables instead of the real copayments due to the 
difficulties in finding appropriate instrumental variables when the econometric 
specification includes both the part of the total price paid by the NHS and the part 
paid by the patient for both the average brand-name product and the generic. This 
is an issue that will be addressed in future research. 
8. Concluding remarks 
This paper examines competition between generics and brand-name drugs and 
among generics in the most consumed Spanish prescription pharmaceutical 
products: statins (HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors), SSRI antidepressants and proton 
pump inhibitors (antiulcers), from 1999 to 2005.  
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The main result is that patients with greater insurance coverage consumed fewer 
generics than patients with a higher rate of copayment: the greater the level of 
insurance, the lower the proportion of generic prescriptions. This result seems to 
confirm the hypothesis that physicians and pharmacists are better agents for the 
patient than for the third-party payer (tax-payers in Spain) or are influenced by the 
moral hazard of patients and prescribe and dispense more expensive brand-name 
products to those patients who have lower rates of copayment. From this result, it 
seems that the low level of copayment in Spain has affected the penetration of 
generics negatively. 
Secondly, the reference pricing system has had a positive impact on the market 
shares of generic drugs beyond the effects of these regulations through the variation 
of relative prices and copayments. This result indicates that the substitution rules 
and the promotion of generic prescriptions by health authorities have been 
successful in encouraging generic penetration.  
Finally, the order of market entry of generics has important competitive effects. The 
results confirm that an earlier-mover advantage seems to exist for the first generic 
entrants, which are able to obtain higher market shares.  
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Figure 2. Evolution of the number of generic manufacturers. 
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Note: Data from non-pensioner consumption in 3 representative markets is used (fluoxetine 20 mg 14 capsules, 
omeprazole 20 mg 14 capsules, and simvastatin 40 mg 40 tablets). 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of generic and brand-name market share. 
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Note: Data from consumption in 3 representative markets is used (fluoxetine 20 mg 14 capsules, omeprazole 20 mg 14 
capsules, and Simvastatin 40 mg 40 tablets). 
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Figure 4. Evolution of generic and brand-name prices per DDD 
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Note: Are used weighted average prices from non-pensioners consumptions of 3 representative markets (fluoxetine 20 
mg 14 capsules, omeprazole 20 mg 14 capsules, and Simvastatin 40 mg 40 tablets). 
 
Figure 5. Evolution of average generic market share by order of entry 
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Table 1. Sample of drugs 
Therapeutic 
subgroup 
(ATC code) 
Active 
Ingredient 
(ATC code) 
Indications First 
generic 
entry 
Reference 
price 
intro 
Market presentation  
January 
2000 
December 
1999 
20 mg 14 Capsules Proton Pump 
Inhibitors/ 
Antiulcer drugs 
(A02BC) 
 
Omeprazole 
(A02BC01) 
Gastroesophageal 
reflux disease, 
peptic ulcer, 
nonsteroidal anti-
inflammatory 
drug–induced 
peptic ulcer, 
Helicobacter pylori 
infection and 
Zollinger-Ellison 
syndrome. 
December 
1999 
May 
2002 
20 mg 28 Capsules 
January 
2002 
January 
2004 
10 mg 28 Tablets 
January 
2002 
January 
2004 
20 mg 28 Tablets 
Simvastatin 
(C10AA01) 
Dyslipidemia, 
hypercholesterole
mia, 
hypertriglyceridemi
a, 
Atherosclerotic, 
Ischemic 
cardiomyopathy 
and cardiovascular 
prevention. 
January 
2002 
January 
2004 
40 mg 28 Tablets 
November 
2000 
May 
2002 
20 mg 28 Tablets 
Statins 
(C10AA) 
Lovastatin 
(C10AA02) 
Dyslipidemia, 
hypercholesterole
mia, 
hyperlipoproteine
mia and 
atherosclerotic. 
December 
2000 
May 
2002 
40 mg 28 Tablets 
January 
1999 
December 
1999 
20 mg 14 Capsules Fluoxetine 
(N06AB03) 
Depression, 
bulimia nervosa 
and obsessive 
compulsive 
disorder. 
January 
1999 
December 
1999 
20 mg 28 Capsules 
August 
2002 
January 
2004 
20 mg 14 Tablets Citalopram 
(N06AB04) 
Depression, panic 
disorder and 
obsessive 
compulsive 
disorder. 
August 
2002 
January 
2004 
20 mg 28 Tablets 
October 
2002 
January 
2004 
20 mg 14 Tablets Paroxetine 
(N06AB05) 
Depression, panic 
disorder, social 
phobia disorder, 
generalized anxiety 
disorder, obsessive 
compulsive 
disorder and 
posttraumatic 
stress disorder. 
October 
2002 
January 
2004 
20 mg 28 Tablets 
January 
2003 
May 
2003 
50 mg 30 Tablets 
SSRIs 
Antidepressants 
(N06AB) 
Fluvoxamine 
(N06AB08) 
Depression and 
obsessive 
compulsive 
disorder. 
January 
2003 
May 
2003 
100 mg 30 Tablets 
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Table 2. Market structure at the end of each year. 
Year Number 
of 
markets 
analysed  
Number of 
brand-name 
manufacturers 
Number of 
generic 
manufacturers 
Average 
brand-
name 
price per 
DDD 
Average 
generic 
price per 
DDD 
Generic 
market 
share 
Brand-
name 
market 
share 
1999 3 30 18 0.9770354 0.7391375 0.080517 0.9194829 
2000 6 62 44 0.9637711 0.9653865 0.2409376 0.7590624 
2001 6 74 95 0.8467622 0.6955624 0.3567254 0.6432745 
2002 13 113 186 0.8786461 0.5932166 0.3427948 0.6572052 
2003 15 117 228 0.8335743 0.5467671 0.4720702 0.5279298 
2004 15 119 252 0.4494228 0.3489683 0.6268138 0.3731862 
2005 15 115 292 0.4256382 0.315965 0.6724371 0.3275629 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics for the demand model variables. 
Variable Definition Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Market share ratio 
Generic drug’s 
market share divided 
by the brand-names’ 
market share 
23,584 0.058 0.127 0.000 3.249 
Within-generic share 
Generic drug’s 
market share divided 
by the total generic 
market share 
23,584 0.068521 0.1239926 0.000 1 
Generic price per 
DDD 
Price per DDD of the 
generic drug 
23,584 0.5725827 0.2435079 0.1881696 1.594401 
Average brand-name 
price per DDD 
Average price per 
DDD of the brand-
name drugs 
23,584 0.6836283 0.2874202 0.2871252 1.912889 
Time on the market 
Number of months 
since the entry of the 
generic drug 
23,584 25.22278 17.36645 1 84 
No copayment 
Dummy equal to one 
for a pensioner 
market; 0 otherwise 
23,584 0.5019929 0.5000066 0 1 
Small copayment 
Dummy equal to one 
for drugs to treat 
chronic diseases; 0 
otherwise 
23,584 0.1869912 0.3899127 0 1 
Reference pricing I 
Dummy equal to 1 
from the moment the 
reference price is 
applied to the market 
and until December 
2003; 0 before and 
after 
23,584 0.2962178 0.4565979 0 1 
Reference pricing II 
Dummy equal to 1 
from the moment the 
reference price is 
applied to the market: 
December 2003; 0 
before 
23,584 0.5153494 0.4997749 0 1 
 45 
Number of 
indications 
Number of 
indications for the 
active ingredient 
23,584 3.516494 1.156198 2 6 
DDDs per tablet 
Number of DDDs 
per tablet or capsule 
23,584 1.132802 0.4936907 0.5 2.666667 
Units 
Number of tablets 
per package 
23,584 24.01942 6.332285 14 30 
Presentations 
Number of different 
kinds of presentations 
in the active 
ingredient market at 
the moment of patent 
expiry 
23,584 8.19492 8.28148 1 25 
1st generic entrant 
Dummy equal to one 
for the first generic 
entrant; 0 otherwise 
23,584 0.1662992 0.3723569 0 1 
2nd generic entrant  
Dummy equal to one 
for the second 
generic entrant; 0 
otherwise 
23,584 0.1283497 0.3344859 0 1 
3rd generic entrant 
Dummy equal to one 
for the third generic 
entrant; 0 otherwise 
23,584 0.089637 0.2856671 0 1 
4th generic entrant 
Dummy equal to one 
for the fourth generic 
entrant; 0 otherwise 
23,584 0.077171 0.2668682 0 1 
5th generic entrant 
Dummy equal to one 
for the firth generic 
entrant; 0 otherwise 
23,584 0.0474474 0.2125984 0 1 
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Table 4. Demand model estimation results. 
 
G2SLS Random-Effects with 
IV 
2SGMM Pooled with IV 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Log(Within-generic 
share) 
0.5096438*** 0.03938 0.4858693*** 0.116312 
Log(Generic price per 
DDD) 
-5.97638*** 0.406752 -5.851831*** 1.151446 
Log(Average brand-
name price per 
DDD) 
3.974557*** 0.3919272 4.260158*** 1.086799 
No copayment -0.683159*** 0.0283507 -0.6940663*** 0.0825252 
Small copayment -0.3951118*** 0.0410342 -0.41057*** 0.1044407 
Reference pricing I 0.6243972*** 0.0296523 0.6296013*** 0.1348306 
Reference pricing II 0.9088608*** 0.0866061 1.071127*** 0.2287922 
Time on the market 0.0091641*** 0.0009548 0.0128474*** 0.0031299 
Number of 
indications 
0.2252446*** 0.0203143 0.1968905*** 0.0527988 
DDDs per tablet -0.8450448*** 0.0591827 -0.7988118*** 0.1610417 
Units -0.0433392*** 0.0033594 -0.0418655*** 0.0085255 
Presentations -0.1463136*** 0.0217165 -0.1647776*** 0.0621652 
1st generic entrant 0.8449423*** 0.0881888 0.8205683*** 0.2240418 
2nd generic entrant  0.9300263*** 0.0800414 0.8936855*** 0.2072066 
3rd generic entrant 0.3425538*** 0.0496196 0.2654443** 0.1202887 
4th generic entrant 0.2645661*** 0.0515613 0.1998162 0.1393082 
5th generic entrant 0.3502969*** 0.058836 0.2468072 0.2066256 
Constant -1.571498*** 0.446079 -1.672343* 0.9943072 
Observations 23,584 23,584 
R2 0.5494 0.4729 
Sargan-Hansen 
statistic (p-value)    
1.129  
(0.288) 
1.032 
(0.310) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
tests 
12488.85  
(0.0000) 
4484.80  
(0.0000) 
Note: Therapeutic subgroups and firm-specific fixed effects are included.  
*, **, *** = significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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